The Czech EU presidency officially ends today; for all intents and purposes, however, it ended with the fall of Topolánek’s government. At least, that is what it seems like from Washington, no matter how much some people in retrospect might have tried to cover for the mistakes made.
It definitely was not a pleasant feeling to hear words like “tragedy” and “failure” uttered in connection to the Czech EU presidency at a recent debate in Washington’s Brookings Institute. In personal interviews, the most polite answer, sort of an expression of condolences, could be stated in one sentence: “Well, you didn’t have it easy.” Or just silence, which EU Ambassador to the United States John Bruton took advantage of when he did not oppose any of the aforementioned negative evaluations.
Voices from the Czech cabinets that pointed out that this was not the first country to change government in the middle of an EU presidency sounded somewhat daft on the other side of the Atlantic. What was achieved was achieved before the government collapsed – full stop.
Barack Obama visited Prague, and Washington assessed positively the Czech role in the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis and this country’s general emphasis on the issues surrounding European energy security. This, however, seems to be the only thing during the entire six months upon which, according to Washington, the Czech presidency succeeded at.
‘Road to Hell’
This brings us to the broader frame of transatlantic relations. The Czech EU presidency overlapped with the ascent of the new US administration, which demonstrated its foreign policy interests by sending Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to Asia rather than to Europe for her first foreign visit.
President Obama has visited Europe twice already, but it is obvious that two things held the highest priority for his foreign policy programme: a stop in Turkey and a meeting with the Russian president.
Paradoxically, when it comes to Obama’s interests and alliance with Europe, the Czech EU presidency might have achieved greater weight during the reign of George Bush. He had the Czech Republic marked down as a member of the “new Europe”: the less anti-American part of the continent.
Obama’s administration erased Donald Rumsfeld’s division of the continent, or rather – as Jim Hoagland, foreign policy commentator at the Washington Post, puts it – restored to preference “old Europe”.
That seems only logical given that the situation that the Obama administration really wanted and needed to discuss with the EU in the past months was economic crisis. The Czech Republic’s disadvantage is that it is a lightweight in these matters.
Topolánek’s criticism of Obama’s policy as “the road to hell” “successfully” compensated for this weakness. However, what seemed like a courageous statement of truth in Prague was a kick in the foot from Washington’s perspective: If they can’t do anything else, they will just kick us …
All in all, the historic Czech EU presidency proved right those who consider the rotating system to be confusing and an unnecessary complication for US foreign policy.
This perception existed before the Czech presidency and will last long after it, illustrating a potentially serious problem in the transatlantic relations.
Though this trend was also true for George Bush’s cabinet in his second term, the Obama administration prefers greater EU integration. The Lisbon Treaty, which would cancel the rotating presidency, among other things, would make many things more transparent for the US.
It seems, though, that the United States, if one looks at its Constitution and federal model, presumes that through the treaty the EU would gain a united fiscal policy, for example. That overestimates the capacity and willingness of the old continent to fill the form with content.
The author is Hospodářské noviny’s reporter in the United States.
