Prague, Jan 27 (CTK) – The migrant crisis exposed the unpleasant fact that the European Union has gradually become something that functions well only in “good weather,” but at the moment of crisis, it incessantly improvises which leads to bad ends, Milos Balaban writes in daily Pravo yesterday.
The migrant crisis may have only now laid bare the intentional governance deficit caused by not allowing the genuinely heavy weights of European politics to get to the head of the EU, Balaban writes.
He writes that the able would be capable of directing the EU at the moments of crisis, but they were put aside because the leaders of the strongest EU countries, particularly Germany, did not wish this, fearing that they might be politically overshadowed.
As a result one story is always repeated. A crisis situation emerges (Ukraine, Greece, migrants) and it is German Chancellor Angela Merkel who plays the solo role in decision-making, needing neither Jean-Claude Juncker, nor Donald Tusk, nor Federica Mogherini, Balaban writes.
However, this style of governance has not proved itself. Merkel’s policy in relation to the migrants splits not only Europe, but also Germany itself, which is an even greater problem than others are willing to admit, Balaban writes.
He quotes Hans-Juergen Papier, former chairman of the German Constitutional Court, as saying that “never before has the gap between law and reality been so deep in Federal Germany as it is yesterday.”
Merkel has also been addressed a warning by Bavarian Prime Minister Horst Seehofer who said she could end up unless the federal government changes its migration policy, Balaban writes.
The filing of a complaint with the Constitutional Court is not ruled either if the federal government fails to ensure the German border’ s security, Balaban writes.
He writes that the steep rise in preferences of the Eurosceptic and right-wing populist political party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), should not be underestimated, particularly in the context of the rising support for populist parties across Europe.
However, Europe is afflicted by other issues, too. The problem of bankruptcy-threatened Greece, in which Germany plays a fundamental role, has only been put off, but not prevented, because pension and other structural reforms would send the country into collision with its European creditors, Balaban writes.
He writes that Grexit is still at play, the same as the beginning of the end of the monetary union. This, together with the possible end of the Schengen Area and the closure of borders may bring many people to logically ask why their country should have the euro if there is no Schengen.
As for Russia, it is not actually clear whether it is an enemy, an opponent, or an ally, Balaban writes and adds that reactions to the question differ across Europe.
It is possible to notice a creeping tactic of backing out of the inoperable anti-Russian sanctions that would not be possible with Germany as well as the United States’ consent, Balaban writes.
He writes that the threat posed by Islamic State will probably be also a factor that will contribute to replying the above question.
For the time being, Europe must look into how the rules of European governance could be changed to prevent one sole country from bearing the burden of decision-making and Europe from becoming a global power from time to time only, Balaban writes.
This is also in the interest of Germany itself and it definitely applies twice at the time of a heavy crisis, he writes.
